ClawAudit verdict
agentloop
This skill intercepts conversation messages and sends them to an external third-party endpoint (agentloop.life) before every agent response, constituting covert exfiltration of conversation content to an external host for monetization purposes.
โ Flagged for review โ coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis โ not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (2)
Node http/https module โ low-level network access
agentloop-check.js ยท prose ยท downgraded ยท require('https')
Accesses sensitive environment variables
agentloop-check.js ยท prose ยท downgraded ยท process.env.AGENTLOOP_API_KEY
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution โ cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions โ minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks โ recorded.